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NOTES
Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualffication of Jury Prior to Guilt
Phase of Bifurcated Capital Trial Held Constitutional
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that
criminal defendants have the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."' In Duncan v. Louisiana 2 the United States Supreme Court held that this "general grant of jury trial
for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages
of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants." 3 The
right to a jury trial is thus applicable to the states via the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 4 The practice of death qualifying 5 the juries that
hear capital trials has been a particularly controversial sixth amendment issue.
Nowhere is the preservation of the defendant's right to an impartial jury more
critical than in a capital trial, in which the extreme nature of the possible punishment makes it necessary to ensure that the defendant is treated with scrupulous fairness.
The leading case addressing the issue of death qualification of juries is
Witherspoon v. Illinois.6 In Witherspoon the Supreme Court held that a state
could not inflict the death penalty on a defendant sentenced to die by a jury that
was "chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious
scruples against its infliction." 7 The Court reasoned that such a jury "fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the [defendant] was entitled under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 8 The Court, however, refused to consider
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. Id. at 157-58.
4. Id. at 156.
5. "Death qualified" is the term used to describe juries composed only of jurors who indicate
they are willing to apply the death penalty should it be necessary. See infra note 7.
6. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). For analysis of the application of Witherspoon and its progeny by
North Carolina courts, see Note, Qualifying Jurorsin Capital Trials: Are Sixth Amendment Rights
Adequately Protected in North Carolina?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1213 (1984).
7. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522. The Court reasoned that "a man who opposes the death
penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the
State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror." Id. at 519. The Court was careful to note that
its holding did not affect a state's power to death qualify a jury by excluding those potential jurors
who indicated
(1)that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or
(2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 522-23 n.21. Such jurors are often referred to as "Witherspoon excludables."
8. Id. at 518. The Court concluded that the State's process of death qualification had "produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die," and held that "aState may not entrust
the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of
death." Id. at 521.
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defendant's argument that a death qualified jury also violated his right to an
impartial jury on the issue of guilt. 9 Many commentators have criticized the
Court's limitation of the Witherspoon doctrine to the penalty phase of a trial. 10
Commentators have suggested, in light of both the expansion of sixth and four-

teenth amendment rights in later decisionsII and other significant evidence arising after Witherspoon, 12 that the Court should extend its holding to bar death
9. Id. at 517-18. The Court reviewed defendant's evidence on this issue, id. at 517 n.10, which
consisted of three opinion surveys: Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as
a Juror in Simulated Capital Cases (unpublished manuscript, later published as Toward Expansion of
Witherspoon: CapitalScruples, Jury Biasand Use ofPsychologicalData to Raise Presumptionsin the
Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970)) (surveying 200 college students at Morehouse College
in Atlanta, Georgia); W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1964) (unpublished manuscript) (surveying 187 college students at the University of Texas); H. Zeisel, Some Insights into the Operation of Criminal Juries, (Nov. 1957) (confidential first draft) (surveying 1,248
jurors in New York and Chicago). The Court concluded the evidence was "too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the
determination of guilt." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517. Although it refused to address the issue
directly, the Court did note that
a defendant convicted by ... a [death-qualified] jury in some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt. If he were to
succeed in that effort, the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated
at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or
innocence-given the possibility of accommodating both interests by means of a bifurcated
trial, using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
Id. at 520 n.18.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the exclusion from juries of persons who
would never inflict the death penalty "[resulted] in a systematic exclusion of qualified groups, and
the deprivation to the accused of a cross-section of the community for decision on both his guilt and
his punishment." Id. at 528 (Douglas, J., concurring).
10. See Colussi, The Unconstitutionalityof Death Qualifying a Jury Priorto the Determhation
of Guilt: The Fair-Cross-SectionRequirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 617
(1982); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: CapitalScruples, Jury Bias, and Use of PsychologicalData to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 69 (1970) (published version of the Goldberg article cited in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.10); Jacoby &
Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 387 (1982); White, Death QualifiedJuries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 353, 405 (1980).
11. Commentators often look to such decisions as Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (exclusion
of blacks from jury denied white defendant due process of law) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975) (venires from which petit juries are drawn must reflect fair cross-section of community;
distinctive groups not excludable), as examples of the Court's increasing recognition of the importance of a defendant's right to a jury selected in accordance with the relevant constitutional
principles.
12. This evidence is generally in the form of empirical data and social science studies purporting to analyze juror attitudes. See Berry, Death-Qualificationand the "FiresideInduction," 5 U.
ARK. LITTLE RoCK L.J. 1 (1982); Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of
the Death-QualifiedJury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. I
(1970); Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurorsin CapitalCases Make the Jury More Likely
to Convict? Some CaliforniaEvidence, 3 WOODROW WILSON J.L. 11 (1980); Cowan, Thompson &
Ellsworth, The Effects of Death-Qualificationon Jurors'Predispositionto Convict and on the Quality
of Deliberation, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The
Death-QualifiedJury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); Finch & Ferraro,
The Empirical Challenge to Death-QualifiedJuries: On Further Examination, 65 NEn. L. REV. 21
(1986); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process v. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984); Girsh, The Witherspoon Question: The Social Science atid
the Evidence, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER A. BRIEFCASE, Sept. 1978, at 99; Goldberg, Toward
Expansion of Witherspoon: CapitalScruples, Jury Bias, and Use of PsychologicalData to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 69 (1970); Haney, Juries and the Death
Penalty: Readdressingthe Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980); Jacoby & Pater-
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qualification altogether.' 3 Lower federal court decisions conflict over the proper
14
resolution of this issue.
In Lockhart v. McCree 15 the United States Supreme Court resolved any
doubt as to its position. The McCree Court rejected defendant's argument that
the death qualification of jurors prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital
trial was a violation of his sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury
selected from a fair cross-section of the community.1 6 Instead, the Court held
that the practice of death qualification did not violate the fair cross-section requirement. The Court noted that
the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual
viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can
conscientiously and properly carry out17their sworn duty to apply the
law to the facts of the particular case.
This Note analyzes the Court's reasoning in McCree in the context of prior
sixth amendment decisions and assesses its likely impact on sixth amendment
jurisprudence-both as applied to capital trials and in general. The Note concludes that the Court, in attempting to reconcile its approval of the process of
death qualifying jurors in capital cases with its previous sixth amendment decisions, has issued an unnecessarily broad opinion that threatens to undermine the
sixth amendment rights not only of defendants in capital cases, but of all criminal defendants.
The events that ultimately led to the Court's decision in McCree began on
the morning of February 4, 1978, in Camden, Arkansas, with the robbery of a
gift shop and service station and the murder of its owner, Evelyn Boughton.' 8
Defendant Ardia V. McCree was subsequently arrested and charged with capital
felony murder in the case. 19 At a voir dire hearing prior to the guilt- determinanoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 387 (1982); Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a Death QualifiedJury on the
Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1971); Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 95 (1984); White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed
by Death-Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176 (1973); White, supra note 10, at 405; Winick,
Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections on the Challenge For Cause ofJurors in Capital Cases in a State
in Which the Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 825 (1983); Comment,
Witherspoon-Will the Due Process Clause Further Regulate the Imposition ofthe Death Penalty?, 7
DuQ. L. REV. 414 (1969); Comment, Capital Juries and the Fair Cross-Section Requirement. Moder Constitutional Reasoning in Jury Selection, 73 Ky. L.J. 1109 (1985).
13. E.g., White, supra note 10, at 406.
14. See, e.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2258 (1986); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 565 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984);
Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir.), modified and aff'd, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
15. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
16. Id. at 1770.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1761.
19. Id. Defendant was charged under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501(1)(a) (1977), which
provides:
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tion phase of defendant's trial, 20 the trial judge excluded for cause eight prospective jurors who said they could not vote to impose the death penalty "under any
circumstances. '2 1 The jury convicted defendant of capital felony murder, but
rejected the State's request for the death penalty in favor of life imprisonment
without parole.22 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction
23
on direct appeal.
Defendant subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition "raising inter
alia the claim that 'death-qualification' ... violated his right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to have his guilt or innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community." '24 This
claim was then consolidated with Grigsby v. Mabry,25 an already pending habeas
corpus action involving the same issue. In an evidentiary hearing on the merits
of the petitioners' claims, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas determined that "through the death-qualification practices permitted by the State of Arkansas in the guilt-determination phase of capital trials,
petitioners were denied their right to a neutral jury and to a representative
jury."' 26 The court thus set aside McCree's conviction and ordered the State
"within 90 days, to retry him or to set him free."' 27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in a five-to-four
decision, affirmed the decision of the district court. 28 In explaining its reasoning,
A person commits capital murder if: (a) acting alone or with one or more persons, he
commits or attempts to commit rape, kidnapping, arson, vehicular piracy, robbery, burglary, or escape in the first degree, and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony, or
in immediate flight therefrom, he or an accomplice causes the death of any person under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Id.
20. Under Arkansas law, capital trials are bifurcated into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase
(in the event that a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense), with the same jury sitting in both
phases of the trial. Id. § 41-1301. The Supreme Court approved a similar capital trial procedure in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1761.
22. Id.
23. McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 465, 585 S.W.2d 938 (1979) (en banc).
24. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1761. Defendant thus alleged that the death qualification of the jury
prior to the guilt phase of his trial resulted in two distinct violations of his sixth amendment rights as
applied to the State by the fourteenth amendment. He alleged, first, that the death qualification
process violated his right to an impartial jury, and second, that it violated his right to a jury chosen
from a fair cross-section of the community. Id.
25. 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified and aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). The claim of a third habeas petitioner,
Dewayne Hulsey, was also consolidated with Grigsby. The district court subsequently barred Hulsey
from raising "Grigsby issues" for habeas review, because Hulsey had not raised them before the
Arkansas court "in timely fashion." He had also failed to demonstrate "legally sufficient 'cause' for
the failure to raise the issues" as required by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Hulsey v. Sargent, 550 F. Supp. 179, 187 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
26. Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1324. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on empirical
studies ofjuror attitudes. In fact, the court incorporated an extensive portion of one such study into
its holding. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Berry, supra note 12, at 37-38).
27. Id. at 1324. Grigsby died prior to the district court's decision and Hulsey, see supra note
25, was "denied the right to raise 'Grigsby issues' because of his failure to object to the challenged
procedures as required in State court." Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1324.
28. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nora. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.
Ct. 1758 (1986). In its reasoning the court of appeals noted:
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the court of appeals emphasized the "exhaustive" scope of the evidence in defendant's favor2 9 and the absence of any contradictory studies. 30 The Grigsby
court rejected the holdings of the other circuits because, in its view, they "focused on the wrong issue."' 31 According to the Grigsby court, the proper consideration was "not whether a jury would be biased one way or another." Rather,
the court should determine "whether a death qualified jury [was] more prone to
convict than the juries used in noncapital criminal cases," and "whether an impartial jury can exist when a distinct [Witherspoon excludable] group in the community is excluded by systematically challenging them for cause."'32 The court
quoted with approval Judge McMillan's district court opinion in Keeten
v.Garrison,33 holding that death-qualified juries violate the fair cross-section requirement.3 4 Noting that its decision was in conflict with the decisions of sev35
eral other circuit courts that had previously addressed the issue in question,
The exclusion of jurors who will never consider a penalty of death, approved in Witherspoon, becomes irrelevant when the focus is on the first half of a bifurcated trial; on the
guilt-innocence phase, rather than the penalty determination. Witherspoon does not hold
that jurors unalterably opposed to the death penalty, but who nonetheless can swear to
consider the evidence and follow the law in determining guilt, can be excluded from the
guilt-innocence phase of a bifurcated trial.
Id. at 232. The court modified the district court's decision only insofar as it held that the State
should use separate juries in a bifurcated capital trial. In the appellate court's view, "the procedure
to be followed to secure an impartial jury in the guilt-innocence phase of a trial should be left to the
states." Id. at 243.
The court did suggest, however, that
perhaps the best possible procedure, rather than have two separate juries, would be to add
to the number of alternates who sit in the guilt phase of trial. If the defendant is convicted
a new voir dire could take place and the same jury could be qualified with [Witherspoon
excludables] excluded, to hear the penalty phase of the trial.
Id.
29. Id. at 238.
30. Id. At least one behavioral study has yielded a conclusion contrary to those cited in Grigsby. See Bernard & Dwyer, Witherspoon v. Illinois: The Court Was Right, 8 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 105, 114 (1984) (concluding that "pre-existing attitudes toward capital punishment do not
affect judgments regarding guilt or innocence").
31. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 241 n.31.
32. Id. at 241-42.
33. 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2258 (1986).
34. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 242 (quoting Garrison, 578 F. Supp. at 1167).
35. In Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the evidence
supporting defendant's claim that death-qualified juries were "prosecution-prone" was "far from
conclusive." Further, the court noted, even if the claim was incontrovertible, it still would not prove
that a death-qualified jury was less impartial than a nondeath-qualified jury. The Fifth Circuit
further elaborated on its reasoning in Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1981), modified
and aff'd, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982). In Balkcom, the court observed
that "the logical converse of the proposition that death-qualified jurors are conviction prone is that
nondeath-qualified jurors are acquittal prone, not that they are neutral." Id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on Spinkellink and Balkcom to hold that "members
of the venire who are irrevocably opposed to capital punishment would engage in jury nullification if
permitted to sit at the guilt stage of a capital case and, therefore, would not be impartial fact finders." Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'g 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986); see also Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 565 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (rejecting arguments that death-qualification of jury violated fair crosssection requirement and produced "prosecution-prone" jury); United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike,
538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977) (rejecting defendant's evidence as "fragmentary and tentative").
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the court of appeals expressed hope that36the United States Supreme Court would
grant certiorari to resolve the conflict.

The Supreme Court heard the appeal and, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, it reversed the holding of the court of appeals. 37 The Court based its
conclusions both on its identification of "several serious flaws" in the evidence
on which the lower court based its decision, 3839and on its interpretation of several
of its own prior sixth amendment decisions.

The Court first addressed the evidence on which the lower court based its
holding, noting that only six of the fifteen social science studies on which the
court of appeals relied "even purported to measure the potential effects on the
guilt-innocence determination of the removal from the jury of 'Witherspoon-excludables.'-"40 Further, the Court noted the Witherspoon Court had deemed
three of the six studies "too tentative and fragmentary" to establish the premise
when it had considered them some eighteen years before. 41 The Court also was
critical of the three more recent studies identifying a number of problems 42 and
expressing "serious doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the behavior of actual jurors."' 43 Not content merely to reject the evidence as inconclusive, as it had in Witherspoon, the Court held that even if "the studies [were]
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in
fact [produced] juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries ... the Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cases." 44
Having rejected the evidentiary basis for the lower court's decision that a
death-qualified jury was not an impartial jury, the Court considered the holding
that death qualification of jurors was a violation of the fair cross-section requirement. The Court concluded that the court of appeals' attempt to apply the requirement to petit juries was erroneous because the requirement properly
applied only to venires as a whole.4 5 Further, the Court held that, even if it
were willing to do so, extending the requirement to petit juries would have no
effect on the practice of death qualification, because "[t]he essence of a 'fair
cross-section' claim is the systematic exclusion of 'a distinctive group in the
36. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 239.
37. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
38. Id. at 1762.
39. For a discussion of the Court's decisions in this area, see infra notes 60-110 and accompanying text.
40. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762.
41. Id. at 1763. The three studies in question are listed supra note 9.
42. The Court noted that none of these studies involved actual jurors in a real capital case; two
of the three studies made no attempt to simulate jury deliberation; none of the studies could predict
what effect the inclusion of "Witherspoon excludables" would have on the guilt determination process; and, most importantly, only one of the six studies "attempted to identify and account for the
presence of. . . 'nullifiers,' or individuals [whose] ... deep-seated opposition to the death penalty
would [render them] unable to decide a capital defendant's guilt or innocence fairly and impartially." McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
43. Id. at 1763.
44. Id. at 1764.
45. Id. at 1764-65.
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do not constitute a 'distinctive
community' ",46 and "'Witherspoon-excludables'
47
purposes."
cross-section
fair
group' for
Finally, in rejecting defendant's alternative claim that death qualification
"violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury" 48 as "both illogical and
hopelessly impractical,"'49 the Court primarily relied on its statement in Wainwright v. Witt 50 that "an impartial jury consists of nothing more than 'jurors
who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' "51 The Court reasoned that defendant's attempt to analogize his claim to the claims addressed by
the Court in previous cases involving a capital defendant's right to an impartial
jury was improper.5 2 McCree dealt "not with capital sentencing, but with the
the facts and determining the guilt or injury's more traditional role of finding
'53
nocence of a criminal defendant."
In his dissenting opinion Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, characterized the Court's decision as one rendered "with a glib nonchalance ill-suited to the gravity of the issue presented,"'54 and one that evidenced
"a blatant disregard for the rights of a capital defendant."'55 Convinced that the
Court's rejection of defendant's evidence was unwarranted, Marshall argued
that the evidence 56 was probative of the claim that death qualification of the jury
which convicted defendant "violated his right to an impartial jury, guaranteed
by both the Sixth Amendment and principles of due process." 57 Marshall also
emphasized what he perceived as flaws in the Court's reasoning and noted conflicts with several previous decisions.58 Finally, Justice Marshall strongly criti46. Id. at 1765 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
47. Id. at 1766. For the Court's definition of a "distinctive group," see infra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
48. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766-67.
49. Id. at 1767.
50. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
51. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423).
52. Id. at 1770. Defendant cited Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), two cases that involved a jury acting within the special context of capital
sentencing.
53. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770.
54. Id. at 1771 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Justice Marshall emphasized "the essential unanimity of the results obtained by researchers
using diverse subjects and varied methodologies." Id. at 1773 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Marshall
concluded from his examination of defendant's evidence and the record in Grigsby that
[d]eath-qualified jurors are, for example, more likely to believe that a defendant's failure to
testify is indicative of his guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of
defense attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous convictions ....This
pro-prosecution bias is reflected in the greater readiness of death-qualified jurors to convict
or to convict on more serious charges.
Id. at 1772 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Indeed, Marshall argued that "[t]he true
impact of death-qualification on the fairness of a trial is likely even more devastating than the studies
show." Id. at 1773-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Marshall noted that the clear import of the Court's decision in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980), was that
even where the role of the jury at the penalty stage of a capital trial is limited to what is
essentially a fact-finding role, the right to an impartial jury established in Witherspoon bars
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cized the Court's approval of the practice of using one jury to try both phases of
a bifurcated capital trial. 59
To better understand the McCree Court's decision and its reasoning, it is

necessary to examine the development of the right to a jury trial as well as the
practice of death qualification. The practice of death-qualifying juries that hear

capital cases originated prior to the twentieth century. In 1892 the United
States Supreme Court held in Logan v. United States 60 that in a capital case the
prosecution could challenge for cause jurors who had "conscientious scruples in
regard to the infliction of the death penalty for crime."'6 1 The Court reasoned

that a "juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject, which prevent him
from standing indifferent between the government and the accused, and from
trying the case according to the law and the evidence, is not an impartial
62

juror."1

In the mid-twentieth century the Court began to show concern about the
constitutionality of the practice of excluding various segments of the community
from jury service. 6 3 The Court voiced this concern in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 64 in which it recognized the importance of "an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community," and held that courts must ensure the empanelment of such juries by avoiding the "systematic and intentional exclusion" of
any group in the community for "economic, social, religious, racial, political and
the State from skewing the composition of its capital juries by excluding scrupled jurors
who are nonetheless able to find those facts without distortion or bias.
McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1777 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall argued that "[t]his proposition can
not be limited to the penalty stage of a capital trial." Id.
Justice Marshall further argued that the Court's reasoning was untenable in light of its holding
in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978), in which a criminal conviction rendered by a fiveperson jury was unconstitutional under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. In Ballew the Court
had emphasized the importance of ensuring the objectivity of juries through the "counterbalancing
of various biases" held by individual jurors. Id. at 234. In Marshall's view, death qualification upset
such "counterbalancing." McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1778 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall also noted
the Ballew Court's acceptance of empirical evidence on the issue of jury "imbalance," and its scrutiny of jury procedures operating to the "'detriment of... the defense.'" Id. at 1778-79 (Marshall,
J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236). The McCree majority dismissed Ballew from consideration because it "did not involve jury selection at all, but rather the size of the petit jury." Id. at
1765 n.14.
59. McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1780-82 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
60. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
61. Id. at 298.
62. Id.

63. Prior to this time, the Court had held in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
that the statutory exclusion of blacks from jury participation was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 310. The Court eventually developed the concept that venires, but not necessarily
individual juries, should be composed so as to reflect the various "distinctive groups" within the
community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). The McCree Court identified such
groups as blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans as "distinctive" within the meaning of its previous decisions. McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1765. Further, the Court noted the historical tendency to
exclude members of such groups from jury service for reasons wholly unrelated to their ability to
serve. Id. at 1765-66.
64. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). The Court had announced a similar opinion in Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128 (1940), in which it unanimously held that "[it is part of the established tradition in the use
of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." Id. at 130.
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geographical" factors. 6 5 Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Fay v. New
York 66 expressed a similar view. Justice Murphy in dissent argued that "there
is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents a crosssection of the community," 67 and that "[w]e can never measure accurately the
prejudice that results from the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from
'68
a jury panel."
In Peters v. Kiff 69 the Court expanded its notion of what kinds of exclusions were likely to infringe on a defendant's right to an impartial jury.70 The
Court observed that "the exclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive
to admit of confinement to particular issues or particular cases." '7 1 The Court
also noted that such exclusions had the additional undesirable effect of "[removing] from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human expe72
rience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."
The Court emphasized the importance of the sixth amendment right to jury
trial in criminal cases in its decision in Duncan v. Louisiana.73 In Duncan the
'74
Court noted this right was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"
and the right existed in state courts, via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, in all cases in which it would apply if they were being tried in a
federal court. 75 This decision was of particular significance because it laid the
doctrinal foundation necessary for the Court to impose its sixth amendment
holdings on the states. The reasoning in Duncan provides the basis for the argument that an abridgement of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights is a
denial of due process and thus violates the fourteenth amendment. This due
process argument is implicit in all subsequent cases involving the constitutionality of death-qualified juries in state criminal trials, because the fourteenth
amendment provides the necessary basis for the application of sixth amendment
rights in such cases.
Having established that the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment applied to defendants in state criminal trials, the Court almost immediately decided Witherspoon v. Illinois76 and its companion case Bumper v. North
Carolina.77 Basing its decision on the sixth amendment guarantee of impartial65. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
66. 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (majority affirmed state's use of "blue ribbon" jury panel that excluded
substantial segment of population based on questionnaire designed to test intelligence).
67. Id. at 299 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 300 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
70. Although the case deals with the denial of a white defendant's right to due process of law by
exclusion of blacks from the jury that heard defendant's case, its implications are much broader.
71. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.
72. Id. The Court further noted that because of the uncertainty of the effect of such exclusions,
"proof of actual harm, or lack of harm, is virtually impossible to adduce." Id. at 504.
73. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id.
76. 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
77. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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ity, the Witherspoon Court held that a state could not inflict a death sentence if it
had excluded potential jurors from sitting on the jury in a capital case solely
because those persons voiced "general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 78s The Court
thus established a strict test, allowing exclusion only of those jurors who made it
"unmistakably clear" that they would either refuse to impose the death penalty
under any circumstances or would be unable to make an impartial determination
as to a defendant's guilt because of their strong feelings about capital punishment. 79 In Witherspoon defendant also argued that death qualification of the
jury violated his right to an impartial jury on the issue of guilt, but the Court
refused to rule on this issue, deeming the evidence "too tentative and fragmentary" to substantiate defendant's claim. 80
In Bumper the Court noted that Witherspoon did not apply because the jury
recommended that the trial court sentence defendant to life in prison rather than
impose the death penalty. 8 1 The Court rejected defendant's argument that the
trial court's exclusion from the jury of persons who would not have been excludable under Witherspoon was a violation of his sixth amendment right to trial by
an impartial jury. 82 As in Witherspoon, the Court predicated its denial of defendant's claim on the insufficiency of the evidence, noting that defendant "adduced no evidence to support the claim that a jury selected as this one was is
necessarily 'prosecution prone.' "83
Moving from the requirement of impartiality to the "fair cross-section" language of the sixth amendment, the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana 84 further enlarged the scope of the right to jury trial in criminal cases. In Taylor the Court
held that the fair cross-section requirement was "fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."' 85 Although the Court had previously
indicated its approval of the practice of selecting jurors from a cross-section of
the community, 86 it had never before specifically held that the fair cross-section
requirement was a "fundamental" sixth amendment right. The Court limited the
requirement, however, to "the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires
from which juries are drawn" 87 and stated that it "[imposed] no requirement
that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. 88 In Duren v. Missouri89 the Court
refined the Taylor holding to a list of three factors that a defendant seeking to
78. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
79. Id. at 522-23 n.21.
80. Id. at 517; see supra note 9.
81. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 545.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (exclusion of women from venires held violative of defendant's right to
jury chosen from fair cross-section of community).
85. Id. at 530.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
87. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
88. Id.
89. 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (state's broad exemption of women from jury duty constituted prima
facie violation of fair cross-section requirement).
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prove a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement must
demonstrate:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the juryselection process. 90
The Court first applied Taylor to the practice of death qualifying juries in
Lockett v. Ohio.91 In Lockett the Court rejected defendant's argument that
death qualification of a jury in accordance with the principles enunciated in
92
Witherspoon violated the fair cross-section requirement as defined in Taylor.
The Lockett Court commented that Taylor did not "[suggest] that the right to a
representative jury includes the right to be tried by jurors who have explicitly
'93
indicated an inability to follow the law and instructions of the trial judge."
The Court again addressed the Witherspoon assurance of an impartial jury
at the penalty phase of a trial in Adams v. Texas.94 The Adams court invalidated
a death sentence imposed by a jury qualified under a penal statute95 that called
for the exclusion of any prospective juror in a capital case who could not
"'[state] under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for
life [would] not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.' ",96 The Court held
that, as applied, the statute violated the Witherspoon doctrine because the State
used it to exclude not only those potential jurors who indicated "an unwillingness or an inability" to abide by the law and the court's instructions, but also
those who merely could not swear that the possibility of a death sentence would
have no effect on their deliberations, or were uncertain as to whether or not their
deliberations would be "affected." '97 The Court concluded that, absent some
indication the jurors "were so irrevocably opposed to capital punishment as to
frustrate the State's legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally valid
death penalty scheme,"' 98 a state could not exclude jurors simply because they
conceded or were unable to determine whether the prospects that the death penalty might be imposed would affect either their evaluation of the facts or what
they might deem to be a reasonable doubt. 99 Aside from its obvious importance
90. Id. at 364.
91. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

92. Id. at 595-97.
93. Id. at 596-97.
94. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
95. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
96. Adams, 448 U.S. at 42 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974) (emphasis added)).
97. Id. at 49-50.
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id. at 50. The Court reasoned that
[s]uch assessments and judgments by jurors are inherent in the jury system, and to exclude
all jurors who would be in the slightest way affected by the prospect of the death penalty or
by their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the defendant of the impartial jury
to which he or she is entitled by law.
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as a reaffirmation of the Witherspoon doctrine, 10 0 Adams was also significant as
the Court's first extension of the doctrine to a bifurcated trial.' 0'
Relying on its reasoning in Adams, the Court developed a new standard for

death qualification of juries in Wainwright v. Witt.10 2 The new standard, which
the Court termed the "Adams test," was that a prospective juror in a capital trial
could be excluded for cause if it seemed likely to the trial judge that the juror's

views on capital punishment would "'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath.'- 103 As noted by a number of commentators, 304 Witt did far more than
simply "reaffirm" the standard for juror exclusion established in Adams, as
claimed by the Court. 105 Whereas Adams initially appeared to be no more than
a reaffirmation or even an expansion of the Witherspoon doctrine, the Witt Court

held that Adams had in fact replaced the strict Witherspoon test for juror exclusion with a standard designed to "simplify" the trial court's task of death qualifyingjuries. 106 In reaching its decision the Court dismissed the notion that there
was something "talismanic about juror exclusion under Witherspoon merely because it [involved] capital sentencing .... ,107 Indeed, the Court reasoned:
Here, as elsewhere, the quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. That is what an "impartial" jury consists of, and we do not think, simply because a defendant is being tried
for a capital crime, that he is entitled to a legal presumption or stan-

dard that allows jurors to be seated who quite likely will be biased in
Id.
100. See, eg., Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process: Texas Penal Code Section 12.31(b)
Unconstitutionally Permits the Exclusion for Cause of Jurors Who Have General Objections To, or
Religious orMoral Scruples Against the Death Penalty--Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), 9 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 251 (1981); Note, Witherspoon Revived Adams v. Texas, 18 Hous. L. REV. 931 (1980);
Note, Texas Law Requiring Veniremen's Oath That the Death Penalty Will Not Affect Their Deliberations is Unconstitutionalas Applied: Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 3521 (1980), 12 TEX. TEcH4 L.
REV. 764 (1981).
101. Adams, 448 U.S. at 45-46. The Adams Court did not address the constitutionality of the
process of death-qualifying jurors prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, because the
case raised only issues related to the penalty phase of such a trial.
102. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
103. Id. at 420 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45).
104. See Comment, Wainwright v. Witt andDeath-QualifiedJuries:A Changed StandardBut an
Unchanged Result, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1187 (1986); Comment, Excluding Death Penalty Opponents
from CapitalJuries: Witt, Witherspoon, and the Impartial Juror,34 U. KAN. L. REV. 149 (1985);
Note, The Battle Over the Standardsfor Death-QualifyingJuries: Defendants Lose Another Round,
Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985), 61 CmI.[-]KENT L. REV. 611 (1985); Note, Constitutional
Law-Does the New Death QualificationStandardEnsurea Biased Jury? Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.
Ct. 844 (1985), 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 579 (1986); Note, Who's Qualified to Decide Who Dies?
Wainwright v. Witt, 105S. Ct. 844 (1985), 65 NEB. L. REV. 558 (1986); Note, Wainwright v. Witt:
A New Standardfor Death Qualifying a CapitalJury, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 133 (1985).
105. It is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Adams, delivered the
Court's opinion in Witt, and praised the reasoning of the "Adams test." Compare Adams, 448 U.S.
at 52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing against further expansion of Witherspoon) with Witt, 469
U.S. at 421 (recognizing that "the Adams test is preferable [to Witherspoon] for determining juror
exclusion" and that Adams "is proper because it is in accord with traditional reasons for excluding
jurors and with the circumstances under which such determinations are made").
106. Witt, 469 U.S. at 421.
107. Id. at 423.
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his favor. 10 8
Another significant holding of the Witt Court was that a federal statute' 0 9 required federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions to presume the correctness of a trial court's death qualification of a jury in the absence of "clear and
convincing evidence" to the contrary. 110
Against this background of gradual narrowing of the Witherspoon holding,
the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v. McCree. The significance of McCree lies
in its almost certain chilling effect on defendants' claims of state abuse of the
death-qualification process. In conjunction with Witt, McCree expresses the
Supreme Court's view that a state's interest in empanelling a jury that is willing
to convict a capital defendant and impose a death sentence outweighs the countervailing interest in the preservation of the defendant's sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights as defined by Witherspoon and other prior decisions concerning the right to jury trial. Witt gives the state courts broad discretion in deathqualifying juries and ensures that their determinations will be accorded a presumption of correctness if reviewed by a federal court. 11I McCree complements
Witt by eliminating two avenues of appeal. The first, initially raised in Witherspoon,112 is that a defendant might gain appellate relief by adducing evidence to
prove the death-qualification process affected the jury's impartiality on the issue
of guilt. 113 The second is the possibility that a defendant might successfully
argue the process of death qualification violated the fair cross-section requirement by excluding, as a group, those persons presumably most likely to have
given fair consideration to the defendant's interests. 114 In addition, the McCree
Court reaffirmed the death-qualification standard enunciated in Witt.115
The implication of McCree is that the Court will strictly limit the application of Witherspoon and its progeny in future cases.1 16 In order to raise a successful claim under McCree that a court improperly excluded a potential juror in
violation of the Witherspoon doctrine, a defendant will have to satisfy two requirements. First, defendant must introduce clear and convincing proof that the
trial judge excluded potential jurors even though he had no basis to believe their
views toward capital punishment would "'prevent or substantially impair the
108. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966) (addressing habeas corpus powers of federal courts).
110. Witt, 469 U.S. at 435. This ruling is likely to impair a defendant's chances of being granted
habeas corpus relief on the death-qualification issue. One commentator accurately observed that
"Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Adams and his majority opinion in Witt contains [sic] language that
enables one to predict easily the outcome of the Court's upcoming ruling in Lockhart v. McCree."
Note, Who's Qualified to Decide Who Dies? Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985), 65 NEB. L.
REV. 558, 581 (1986). For a strong approval of the process of death-qualification, see Comment,
Death Qualification: Are Capital Defendants Entitled to Acquittal-Prone Juries? An Argument in
Support of the Status Quo, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 193 (1985).
111. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
112. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
113. McCree, 106 S.Ct. at 1764.
114. See id. at 1766; infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
115. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1767.
116. Id. at 1770. The Court "reject[ed] McCree's suggestion that Witherspoon and Adams [had]
broad applicability outside the special context of capital sentencing, and conclude[d] that those two
decisions [did] not support the result reached by the Eighth Circuit." Id. (footnote omitted).
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performance of [their] duties as ... [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath.' ",117 Second, defendant must make this allegation only
with regard to his sentence, not his conviction. 118 Thus, a defendant in a capital
case who does not receive a death sentence will be unable to raise in an appeal or
a habeas corpus petition the issue of improper death qualification of the jury.
The McCree Court's reasoning suggests that the policy considerations surrounding the death qualification issue have undergone a drastic change since Witherspoon. Public dissatisfaction with the justice system's apparent inability to deal
efficiently with crime perhaps has induced the Court to accord more importance
to the state's desire to get violent criminals off the streets than to the preservation and expansion of the rights of criminal defendants. The use of death-qualified juries is not a problem that lends itself to easy resolution by the effectuation
of some sort of compromise between the competing interests of the state and the
defendant. In McCree the Court had to undertake the difficult task of balancing
a legitimate state interest against an important individual right and choosing one
over the other.
The McCree Court was reasonably successful in reconciling its holding with
prior decisions involving the right to jury trial under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. In particular, the Court carefully explained its reasons for refusing to allow the fair cross-section analysis in Taylor 119 and Duren 120 to support
defendant's claim. The Court noted that both Taylor and Duren specifically
held that the fair cross-section requirement applied only to the venires from
which petit juries were chosen. 121 The Court stressed that it had "never invoked
the fair cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to
22
jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at large."'
In explaining its holding that Witherspoon excludables do not constitute a "distinctive group" within the meaning of the test for a violation of the fair crosssection requirement set out in Duren, 123 the Court distinguished between the
exclusion of "Witherspoon-excludables" from death-qualified jury panels and
the exclusion of groups such as blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans from
venires. 124 The Court reasoned that the latter groups were historically excluded
from jury service "for reasons completely unrelated to the ability of members of
the group to serve as jurors in a particular case," thus violating a criminal defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. 12 5 Members of the former
117. Id. at 1761 n.1 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 420).
118. See id. at 1764.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
121. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1764.
122. Id. The Court noted that, in its recent decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986) (in which prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from petit jury violated
defendant's right to equal protection of the laws), it "expressly [declined] to address [defendant's]
'fair-cross-section' challenge to [a prosecutor's] discriminatory use of peremptory challenges." McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
123. See supra text accompanying note 90.
124. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
125. Id. at 1765.
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"group," however, were excluded specifically because of their inability or unwillingness to "properly and impartially apply the law to2 6the facts of the case at both
the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial."'
One problem area the McCree Court declined to address was the possibility
that prosecutors would seek the death penalty, in cases in which they otherwise
would not, to obtain the benefit of trying their cases before more convictionprone,' 2 7 death-qualified juries, and would then waive the death penalty after
obtaining the desired conviction. Although defendant argued that this practice
was common in Arkansas, the Court refused to consider the issue because "the
8
State did not 'waive' the death penalty in McCree's case." 12 The Court simply
rejected the notion "that 'death-qualification' was instituted as a means for the
state to arbitrarily skew the composition of 30capital juries,' 12 9 and noted that
defendant "[did] not even argue the point."'
A more serious problem with the McCree decision is the majority's use of
overly broad language in its holding. The Court concluded, "[t]he Constitution
presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community is
impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on
the jury."' 13 1 This conclusion could conceivably provide a doctrinal basis for
unscrupulous prosecutors and trial judges to "stack the deck" against criminal
defendants by excluding from petit juries those members of the venire who seem
most concerned with the defendants' interests. Because the holding is not specifically limited to capital cases, the decision if applied in this manner would undermine much of the Court's prior sixth amendment jurisprudence relating to
jury trials.
Although this application of McCree appears unlikely, it is theoretically
possible. What is certain is that, when combined with the broad juror exclusion
and the presumption of correctness propagated in Witt, this language will almost
certainly strip capital defendants of the rights that Witherspoon sought to
protect.
In McCree the United States Supreme Court held that death qualification of
juries was constitutional as to both the guilt and sentencing phases of a bifurcated capital trial. The Court rejected defendant's evidence as inconclusive and
indicated it would have upheld the process of death qualification even if there
had been valid indicia that the juries selected thereby were somewhat more con126. Id. at 1766.
127. Although the Court rejected the notion that death-qualified jurors are more conviction
prone, there is much to be said for one federal judge's observation that "[clommon sense suggests
that people who favor the death penalty are more likely to convict defendants charged with capital
crimes, and that people who do not favor the death penalty are less likely to convict defendants
charged with capital crimes." Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 742
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986).
128. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766 n.16.
129. Id. at 1766.
130. Id. Defendant presumably realized that such an argument, although not without some
merit, would have been an exercise in futility given the Court's historic approval of the practice of
death qualification.
131. Id. at 1770.
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viction-prone. 1 32 The Court also refused to recognize Witherspoon excludables
as a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. 1 33 Finally, the Court refused to consider the imposition of a requirement that juries be selected so as to
allow Witherspoon excludables to participate in the guilt phase of a bifurcated
capital trial. 134 Implicit in this holding is the Court's position that death-qualified juries are impartial and representative of a fair cross-section of the community. Further, the decision reflects a recognition of a state's interest in using the
process of death qualification to empanel "a single jury that can properly and
impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing
phase of a capital trial." 135 Along with Witt, 13 6 McCree marks a substantial
departure from the Court's previous, defendant-oriented decisions in this area.
This departure is understandable-and to some extent justifiable-in view of the
public's increasing demand for more efficient disposition of criminal offenders.
Unfortunately, however, the McCree Court delivered an unnecessarily broad
opinion whose language appears to threaten the sixth amendment rights not
only of capital defendants but also of criminal defendants in general. Thus,
although the decision will have an arguably beneficial effect by discouraging
many of the unnecessary appeals and habeas corpus petitions that continually
undermine the states' expeditious execution of duly-imposed criminal sanctions,
it also holds potential for abuse on a large scale, if given the broad application its
language suggests.
MAURY ALBON HUBBARD

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1766-67.
Id. at 1768. For an example of such a requirement see supra note 28.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
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